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Resumen: El propósito de este trabajo es discutir la impor-
tancia creciente de la experimentación en el 
análisis económico. Presentamos varios mode-
los económicos que han sido explorados usando 
técnicas de laboratorio. También nos ocupamos 
de algunas de las objeciones más comunes a la 
experimentación, así como de las principales 
lecciones que se han aprendido de ella. 
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to discuss the grow-
ing importance of experimentation in economic 
analysis. We present a variety of economic is-
sues that have been explored with laboratory 
techniques. We also address some common ob-
jections to experimentation, as well as some of 
the principal lessons that have been learned. 
1. Introduction 
Economics is a study of practical affairs. Economists spend their time trying 
to find reasonable solutions to complex social problems such as debt crises, 
pollution, inflation, and bureaucratic stagnation. Despite this penchant tor 
the practical, economists also see themselves as scientists. Like other scientists 
economists observe events in nature, devise theories to explain their observa-
tions, and evaluate their theories in light of additional evidence. 
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But not all commentators share the view that economics is both a policy-
oriented study and a science. As the Enciclopedia Britannica (1991, p. 395) 
observes, 
"Economists are sometimes confronted with the charge that their dis-
cipline is not a science. Human behavior, it is said, cannot be analyzed 
with the same objectivity as the behavior of atoms and molecules. Value 
judgements, philosophical preconceptions, and ideological biases must 
interfere with the attempt to derive conclusions that are independent of 
the particular economist espousing them. Moreover, there is no 
laboratory in which economists can test their hypothesis". 
Of course, most economists disagree with this view. It is not difficult, 
however, to appreciate its source. Economists often have very definite precon-
ceptions about the desirability of market outcomes. Moreover, the bewilder-
ing collection of markets and activities that constitute the "economic jungle" 
is a rather difficult place to corner facts which would prove, dispel or even 
alter preconceived notions about the marketplace. 
Matters are not improved by modern economic methods. Economic 
theories are often highly abstract mathematical models that can look incredib-
ly arcane to an outsider. The standard empirical procedures used by the 
economist are similarly complex. Moreover, when applied to typical data 
sources from natural markets, the economists' empirical tools often constitute 
a rather cumbersome camera, a camera that rarely allows definitive focus on a 
theoretical or policy issue.
1 
Economics is far from unique among sciences in terms of theory com-
plexity. To the contrary, theoretical physicists, chemists and molecular 
biologists all routinely rely on mathematical techniques that rival even the 
most complex methods of the economist. Rather, it is the limited capacity for 
theory evaluation that usually distinguishes economics from the traditional 
"hard" sciences, where abstract theoretical propositions have been evaluated 
and refined through the use of controlled laboratory experimentation. In 
contrast, economists have generally relied exclusively on data from events as 
they occur in the complex natural economy. 
The scientific community has immense respect for the power of 
laboratory techniques, so much so, that one synonym for a "hard science", 
might be a "laboratory science." This respect is rightfully placed, as the 
interchange between theory and evidence made possible by laboratory inves-
1 This is not always true. The extreme economic changes that we have seen recently 
in Mexico, for example, provide a natural experiment in which economic predictions 
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tigation is the very foundation of modern scientific method. But there is no 
reason why economics cannot also become a laboratory science. Although 
humans are neither chemical processes nor molecules, human behavior can 
be observed objectively and replicated in a controlled context. 
In fact, although laboratory techniques are neither widely known, nor 
(until recently) widely used by economists, the economics laboratory most 
definitely exists. Granted, when viewed in light of the elaborate equipment 
of the experimental physicist or chemist, the economics laboratory is quite 
crude. The authors' laboratories, for example, are just classrooms with banks 
ef networked personal computers, separated by laminated styrofoam sheets.
2 
Moreover, the economic situations investigated in the economics laboratory 
bear little resemblance to any natural market. The experimental environments 
are highly simplified variants of more complicated models or markets. Final-
ly, the laboratory decision makers are far different from the decision makers 
that are the subject of many economic models. Laboratory decision makers 
are usually college students, who are motivated by relatively small financial 
rewards, who often know little about economics in general, and who usually 
know nothing about the particular context being investigated. Nevertheless, 
after observing the results of many interactions among students in these 
simplified environments, we have come to believe that experimental inves-
tigation represents an empirical tool that can help economists isolate the 
explanatory power of a variety of theories. In particular, laboratory investiga-
tion has given us a lot of confidence in our basic intuition that unregulated, 
decentralized markets can solve complex production and allocation problems 
in a remarkably efficient manner. 
2. A Laboratory Market 
Consider an experiment designed to evaluate competitive price, quantity and 
efficiency predictions in a simple partial-equilibrium setting. Evaluation of 
such predictions requires specification of cost and value conditions for some 
good. Rather than using some specific good, it is convenient to design the 
market in terms of an abstract commodity that has value to the buyers and 
sellers only in terms of cash profits or earnings obtained from trade. Use of 
an abstract commodity of this sort facilitates experimental control, as it avoids 
the unobservable preference differences that may exist among participants 
2 We are referring to laboratories at Virginia Commonwealth University and the 
University of Virginia. More sophisticated economics laboratories do exist, and in a 
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for specific goods such as candy bars, records or sardines, which could also 
be traded in a laboratory setting. 
The preferences and technology for the laboratory commodity are in-
duced by explaining to subjects how they can earn money. For example, one 
simple laboratory market set-up might involve passing out a number of cards 
to buyers and sellers. A redemption value would be printed on each of the 
cards passed to buyers, who would be told that they can keep the difference 
between this printed redemption value and a price that they negotiate with 
a seller in the market. Thus, if the number printed on a buyer card is $1.90 
and if the buyer negotiates a transactions price of $1.00, then the buyer earns 
90 cents. Because earnings are paid in cash, $1.90 represents that buyer's 
maximum willingness to pay, or unit demand. 
Similarly, unit costs are printed on the cards passed to sellers, who are 
told that they will earn the difference between the price they negotiate and 
the printed cost number. For example, if $.80 is printed on a seller card and 
the seller negotiates a transactions price of $1.00, then the seller would earn 
20 cents. Since earnings are paid in cash, the number printed on the card 
represents the seller's minimum willingness to sell, or unit cost. 
Market demand and supply functions can be created by varying the 
numbers on cards given to different buyers and sellers. Ordering value cards 
from highest to lowest generates a market demand curve and ordering cost 
cards from lowest to highest generates a market supply curve, as shown in 
Figure 1. The intersection of these curves allows identification of the standard 
competitive equilibrium predictions. In the Figure 1 design, for example, a com-
petitive equilibrium allocation involves a quantity of seven units, and any 
price between $1.30 and $1.40. The trading surplus, or maximum gain from 
trade is $3.70. This maximum surplus, of course, corresponds to the area 
above the supply curve, below the demand curve and to the left of the 
equilibrium quantity prediction. 
These predictions exhibit a number of desirable features. Perhaps most 
importantly, they are unambiguously specified ex ante by the researcher, and 
may be evaluated in light of subsequently collected data. Moreover, these cost 
and value conditions may be easily altered to generate predictions in nearly 
any desired market structure. Combined, these features allow a great deal of 
flexibility regarding the investigation of the competitive tendencies of markets. 
This is in stark contrast to the analysis of data from most naturally occurring 
markets, where a market structure is given, and where both market structure 
and performance must be assessed from the data, ex post. 
A second critical advantage of specifying a laboratory market design is 
that it forces a very detailed consideration of the way the market is ad-
ministered. Although largely ignored in standard economic theory, trade is 
governed by a series of conventions that have evolved or have been externally EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 183 
imposed. A set of such trading rules, or trading institution, must also be 
specified in the laboratory. One of the primary results of market experimen-
tation is that performance can be critically affected by variations in the trading 
institution. 
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The importance of trading rules became evident at the outset of market 
experimentation. For example, the very first reported market experiment was 
conducted by Chamberlin (1948), who, upon observing the failures of markets 
in the Depression, believed that there were features inherent in the competi-
tive process that would tend to generate inefficient outcomes. To evaluate his 
hypothesis, Chamberlin conducted a classroom market under a negotiated 
price institution, where participants walked around the room and completed 
contracts via a series of private, unstructured negotiations. In this laboratory 
market, Chamberlin did observe his predicted efficiency losses.
3 
3 The inefficiencies arose from a tendency for privately negotiating agents with 
m/ramarginal units (e.g., units to the left of the intersection of aggregate supply and 
demand) to complete contracts with agents holding pxiramarginal units (to the right of 
the equilibrium prediction). In terms of Figure I, for example, such an inefficiency loss 
would arise if B6 completed a contract for a first, high-value unit with S5, who was 
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Subsequent experimentation was motivated by the idea that competitive 
price theory would be given a better test in a market where bids and asks were 
publicly tendered from a centralized location, as in a stock exchange. Vernon 
Smith (who incidentally was a participant in Chamberlin's market) devised 
an alternative set of trading rules, now known as the double-auction trading 
institution. In the double auction, buyers are free to accept the price "ask" 
of sellers, or to propose alternative terms in the form of "bids". Symmetrically, 
sellers may accept the bids proposed by buyers, or counter with asks. All bid 
and ask information is public, and is typically submitted under a bid/ask 
spread-reduction rule, or a condition that only proposals that improve upon 
the best standing terms are admissible. 
Outcomes in Smith's double-auction markets conformed much more 
closely to competitive equilibrium predictions.
4 In fact, competitive predic-
tions turn out to be remarkably robust in double- auction markets. Competi-
tive allocations are generated in double- auction markets under extreme 
structural conditions (sometimes even under monopoly), and under unusual 
supply and demand configurations (for example in situations where the 
distribution of earnings goes entirely to one side of the market).
5 For this 
reason, the double auction has become a performance standard against which 
other institutions are evaluated. 
It is instructive to consider double-auction trading in more detail. Table 
1 illustrates negotiations for a single double-auction contract in a laboratory 
market we recently conducted.
6 The motivation for "double-auction" ter-
minology should be clear from this table. Starting with seller S4's opening ask 
of $2.00, sellers compete by offering progressively lower terms. Similarly, 
buyers compete with each other by increasing bids from buyer B5's opening 
inframarginal unit from making a sale with an inframarginal buyer. In Chamberlin's 
market, one contract involving an infra- and an extra-marginal unit tended to be offset 
by another, similarly inefficient contract. Thus, Chamberlain observed a combination 
of inefficient outcomes, and an excess of traded units over the competitive prediction. 
4 Smith (1963,1964) also differed from Chamberlin in two procedural respects. 
First, rather than motivating participants with hypothetical cash payments, Smith soon 
began to use real financial incentives. Second, Smith's markets were repeated —that is, 
after the expiration of an initial period of trading, buyers and sellers were reendowed 
with unit values and costs for additional trading. Both of these features may also affect 
behavior, and are now standard experimental procedures. 
5 See. e.g, Smith (1982) and Smith and Williams (1990). In fact, competitive 
predictions are 90 pervasive in the double auction that deviations are of considerable 
interest. See e.g., Holt, Langan and Villamil (1986). 
6 This session was conducted in the summer of 1992 at the University of Virginia. 
The market was conducted orally (e.g., without computers), with inexperienced sub-
jects. The market consisted of 6 buyers and 6 sellers, and used the supply and demand 
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bid of $1.00. A contract occurs at a, price between the initial ask and bid 
proposals, when B5 accepts S4's ask of $1.35. Thus, the double-auction 
institution is like two auctions at once, an ascending-price bid auction that 
one of the sellers stops with a sale, and a descending ask-auction that one of 
the buyers stops with a purchase. It Is worth emphasizing that these negotia-
tions are conducted under conditions of an extreme privacy. Although bids 
and asks are centrally displayed, unit values and costs for the negotiating 
buyers and sellers (displayed in parentheses in the extreme left and right 
columns of table 1) are known only to the negotiating agent. Following 
completion of an initial contract,, trading resumes in the double auction, as 
agents begin negotiations for a second unit. Trading continues in this way for 
the second and subsequent units, usually until the' expiration of a prean-
nounced time limit, at which time the trading period ends. 
Table 1 
Negotiations in Double-Auction Trading 
Buyer 
(Value) ID Bid 
Seller 
Ask ID (Cost) 
($1.80) B5 $1.00 
($1.60) B3 $1.10 
($1.40) Bl $1.25 
$2.00 S4 ($1.00) 
$1.90 S2 ($1.20) 
$1.80 S3 ($1.10) 
$1.70 S5 ($0.90) 
$1.60 SI ($1.30) 
($1.80) B5  $1.35 S4 ($1.00) 
The results of an initial market trading period are illustrated by the 
left-most pair of vertical bars in Figure 2. In the figure, the dashed horizon-
tal lines illustrate the competitive price band, while the dots illustrate the 
sequence contracts completed in the period. An experimental market 
session typically consists of a sequence of trading periods. After expiration 
of the time-limit for an initial period, buyers and sellers are re-endowed 
with costs and values, and the second trading period begins. The market 
shown in Figure 2 consisted of three traiding periods, and the dots repre-
senting contract prices in each period are separated by vertical bars. 
Trading efficiency is calculated as the total of all subjects' earnings, ex-
pressed as a percentage of the maximum total surplus. This efficiency is 186 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
shown under the price dots for each period. The transactions quantity for the 
period is shown in parentheses. 
Figure 2 
Sequence of Contract Prices for a Double Auction 
Price 
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Efficiency (Quantity Traded) 
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The accuracy of competitive predictions in Figure 2 deserves comment. 
By the second trading period, seven (of seven predicted) units trade, and the 
market is 100% efficient. Moreover, in the second and third periods combined, 
all but one of the contracts are struck in the competitive price band. This occurs 
despite a complete absence of information regarding either equilibrium price 
predictions, or aggregate supply and demand functions. Rather, individuals 
see only their private cost and value information, and the public messages of 
the market. As suggested above, this pattern is typical of double-auction 
markets. 
Still other trading institutions are possible. One very natural alternative, 
for example, is a posted-ojfer institution that parallels many of the important 
features of retail-type exchange. A posted-offer trading period proceeds as a 
two-step sequence. First, sellers select prices independently.
7 These prices are 
collected and then publicly posted, as shown in table 2. Second, after all prices 
7 Sellers also make a private quantity-limit selection. Except for the initial periods 
of a market when learning is incomplete, sellers routinely offer all units that may 
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are posted, buyers are randomly drawn from a waiting mode, and are given 
the opportunity to make purchases at the posted prices, on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis. 
Table Z 
Price Information in a Posted-Offer Trading Period 
S eller  SI  S2  S3  S4  S5  S6 
Price  $1.55  $1.55  $1.35  $1.35  $1.60  $1.40 
(Cost)  ($1.30)  ($1.20)  ($1.10)  ($1.00)  ($0.90)  ($0.80) 
Trading in the posted-offer institution generates much less public infor-
mation than in the double auction. In a posted-offer trading period, the only 
public information is the price postings of sellers. This contrasts sharply with 
the information-rich double auction. Recall, for example, that the sequence of 
double-auction negotiations shown in Table 1 was for a single unit, rather 
than for an entire trading period. Yet more price quotes were generated 
in that negotiation process that for the entire posted-offer trading period 
shown in table 2. 
This limited flow of information, together with the asymmetry between 
buyers' and sellers' activities in a posted offer market, has definite consequen-
ces on market performance. Figure 3 shows the price sequence for a posted-
offer market.
8 This market was conducted under the same induced cost and 
value conditions as the double-auction market just discussed, and the figure 
is formatted in the same manner as Figure 2, except that contracts are denoted 
by "*" markings rather than dots, and the "+" signs indicate price-postings 
where no units were sold. 
Notice the pattern of contract prices for the posted-offer market shown 
in Figure 3. Relative to the scattered price cluster of the double auction, posted 
trading appears to follow a definite structure: Within trading periods, posted-
offer contracts follow an upward trend reflecting the predominant tendency 
for buyers to follow a simple full-revelation strategy of purchasing all avail-
able units, starting with the least expensive units first. Across periods, the 
prices tend to start high and then ease down toward the competitive level. 
These features are general characteristics of posted-offer markets (Davis and 
Williams, 1986). 
8 This market was also conducted at the University of Virginia in the summer 
of 1992. As with the double auction discussed above, the market was conducted 
orally, and used participants who were inexperienced with the posted-offer trading 
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Figure 3 
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But more importantly, notice the comparatively weak performance of the 
posted-offer market, relative to competitive predictions. By the second 
double-auction trading period, shown in Figure 2, for example, all contracts 
but one are in the competitive equilibrium price tunnel, and 100% of the 
possible gains from trade are extracted. In contrast, only four of eight posted-
offer contracts are within the competitive price tunnel in the second 
posted-offer trading period, and only 78% of the possible gains from trade 
are extracted. The pattern continues in trading period 3, where all double-
auction contracts are in the competitive price range and efficiency is 100%, 
while all posted-offer contracts are outside the competitive range, and ef-
ficiency is only 89%. This performance difference is commonly observed: 
Posted-offer markets tend to the competitive equilibrium more slowly than 
double-auction markets, and they extract less of the available surplus in the 
process (Ketcham, Smith and Williams, 1984; Plott, 1986). It also turns out that 
posted-offer markets are more susceptible to conspiracy and the exercise of 
market power than double-auction markets (Isaac, Ramey and Williams, 
1984; Davis and Williams, 1991). 
Experimentalists were not alone in observing the importance of institu-
tional rules. This same lesson, for example, is a primary result of the "new" 
game-theoretic industrial organization literature. But the laboratory data add 
a critical dimension to the investigation, in that they provide a direct link 
between theory and data. The posted-offer environment, for example, closely EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 189 
parallels the assumptions of a Bertrand price-setting game. A comparison of 
equilibrium predictions and observed outcomes allows unique insight into 
the behavioral relevance of alternative equilibrium concepts.
9 
The capacity to test theories in the laboratory is a decisive advantage of 
experimentation, and bears emphasis. Although simple laboratory environ-
ments miss much of the texture of a natural market, they can be made to 
conform to the assumptions of theoretical models in a manner simply not 
possible with natural data. In a laboratory market, for example, demand, 
supply and equilibrium predictions are directly induced, and are specified ex 
ante. In contrast, in a natural market, we can only estimate supply and 
demand, with the use of a number of more or less problematic auxiliary 
assumptions about functional forms, the nature of cost conditions, and 
preferences. 
3. Kinds of Experiments 
Market predictions are only one of the many kinds of economic propositions 
that can be evaluated with experimental methods, and experimentalists have 
examined a wide variety of economic issues in the laboratory. Although it is 
beyond the scope of this presentation to exhaustively review the types of 
experiments that have been conducted, it is useful to convey some teeling for 
the range of applications.
1
0 One way to illustrate the diversity of applications 
is to consider the historical roots of experimentation. Interest in laboratory 
methods in economics arose from three, more or less distinct sources: market 
cooperation and competition, game theory, and individual decision theory. 
We consider these different sources in turn, and discuss briefly how research 
has evolved in each area. 
a) As indicated above, market experiments, have led to an investigation of 
the effects of alterations in the rules defining the trading institution. Some of 
9 The institution-specific models in the new industrial organization literature 
typically unvolve much simpler structures than a posted-offer market. However, Holt 
and Solis-Soberon (1992) have recently begun to use the tools of noncooperative game 
theory to explain observed posted-offer market outcomes. One can intuitively begin to 
see how a posted offer market could be analyzed as a game by considering a single-pe-
riod posted offer market with one buyer, one seller, and a capacity-constraint of a single 
unit for the seller. In such a setting, it should that be obvious an equilibrium for a game 
should involve a seller posting, and the buyer accepting, a limit price equal to the 
buyers' maximum willingness to pay for a unit. 
1
0 Standard reviews include Plott (1982,1989), Smith (1982) and Roth (1988). We 
have attempted to be fairly comprehensive in our book (Davis and Holt, 1992). See also 
Roth and Kagel (forthcoming). 190 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
these studies have a traditional industrial organization focus, such as the 
investigation of mechanisms for regulating and restraining monopoly power 
(e.g., Coursey, Isaac and Smith, 1984; Harrison and McKee, 1985). Other 
investigations have focused on allocations in financial markets (Smith, 
Suchanek and Williams, 1988; Forsythe and Lundholm, 1990). Interest in 
laboratory financial markets has been spurred by the immanence of electronic 
stock exchanges that bypass dealers, especially after the traditional exchanges 
have closed. Still other market investigations have involved assessing the 
likely performance characteristics of new trading institutions in situations 
where allocations have been traditionally determined by direct regulation. 
Examples range from proposed markets for pollution permits (Kruse and 
Elliott, 1990), to proposed markets for transportation rights on gas pipelines 
and electrical-power networks (McCabe, Rassenti and Smith, 1990a, 1990b). 
b) A second class of experiments, game experiments, were initiated in the 
late 1950's and early 1960's by sociologists and social psychologists who were 
unconvinced that rational individuals would stumble into the jointly un-
desirable outcomes predicted in the famous "prisoners' dilemma" game. Due 
to the close link between the structure of this game and oligopoly coordination 
problems, the results of prisoner's dilemma and related game experiments 
were received with considerable interest by economists. 
Table 3 
A Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
Column Player 
HIGH LOW 
HIGH 800,800 0,2000 
Row Player LOw 1000,0 350,350 
The pricing problem faced by duopolists who cannot explicitly conspire, 
for example, is a classic prisoner's dilemma problem, as can be seen by 
considering the game in Table 3. The row and column players must either 
post a HIGH price (top or left) or a LOW price (bottom or right). The (row, 
column) payoff consequences for these decisions are printed in the matrix 
entry for the decisions made. Notice that each seller earns a profit of 800 at 
the joint-maximizing, HIGH price, as indicated in the upper left box. But it is 
risky for a seller to post the joint-profit maximizing price, since profits would 
drop to 0 if the other seller did not reciprocate. At the same time, any seller 
would find it tempting to shade on a joint profit-maximizing price posting, 
since earnings would increase from 800 to 1000 by being the only seller to 
post the competitive price. The temptation to shade on the cooperative price EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 191 
to increase earnings, combined with the incentive to post a LOW price as a 
means of protection against a defection by the other, makes posting the LOW 
price a Nash equilibrium, despite the fact the both players would prefer a 
situation where they both posted HIGH prices. 
Despite the attractiveness of the joint-maximizing solution, experimental 
evidence suggests that the Nash equilibrium has considerable drawing 
power. For example, Cooper et al. (1991) conducted a prisoner's dilemma 
experiment using the incentives in Table 3. In the experiment, participants 
made a series of thirty decisions, facing a different, anonymously assigned 
opponent in each period. Results of this experiment are summarized in Table 
4, in the form of the proportion of HIGH decisions. Notice that HIGH is selected 
less than half the time in matchings 1-5, and in all subsequent groups of 
marchings. Notice also, that the propensity for participants to select LOW 
increases as they become experienced with the game: The rate at which HIGH 
is selected decreases from an average of 43% for matchings 1-5 to 20% for 
matchings 25-30. 
Table 4 
One-Stage Prisoners'Dilemma Game Outcomes 
Matching Number 
1-5  43% 
6-10  33% 
11-15  25% 
16-20  20% 
Source: Cooper et ai, 1991. 
Hundreds of experiments involving games with a prisoner's dilemma 
structure were conducted in the 1960's and 1970's.
n Typically, these experi-
ments involved extensive repetition of a single-stage structure like that shown 
in table 3. Repetition tends to increase the incidence of cooperation. The 
increase, however, is not as much as you might expect. In particular, one 
popular theoretical conjecture is that repetition increases cooperation through 
the use of trigger strategies. That is, participants might support the coopera-
tive HIGH price choice via a threat to punish defection (a LOW price posting), 
with a punishment consisting of several periods of Nash equilibrium play. 
There is little evidence for the notion that subjects regularly support coopera-
1
1 Coleman (1983), for example, cites 1500 papers. 192 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 




Simple games of this sort overlook many of the institutional elements 
that have been shown to affect behavior not only in the natural world, but 
even in laboratory markets. These simple structures are desirable, however, 
in that they facilitate the identification and evaluation of alternative game-
theoretic predictions. This point is more clearly seen in a second example. 
Unlike tne static prisoners dilemma, which has a single Nash equilibrium, 
many games exhibit multiple equilibria. As a general matter, there are a 
variety of ways to discriminate among multiple equilibria. But in the special 
case that the equilibria are Pareto ranked {e.g., some equilibria involve higher 
payoffs to every player than other equilibria), theorists often assume that the 
players coordinate on the equilibrium outcome that is best for all, or the 
Pareto-dominant equilibrium. This assumption is useful for making compara-
tive statics or welfare statements, and is the type of assumption that can be 
tested in the laboratory. 
For an intuitive appreciation of the Pareto-dominance equilibrium selec-
tion criterion, consider the following problem. Suppose a standing university 
committee consists of fifteen members. The committee meets once a week, on 
Friday afternoons. Meetings are scheduled to start each Friday at 3:00 p.m., 
but all members must be present before the meeting can start. Finally, regard-
less of when a meeting starts, it lasts two hours. 
Consider each committee member's incentives to appear at a particular 
meeting. On the one hand, everyone would prefer to start on time, and go 
home promptly at 5:00 p.m. On the other hand, no one wants to arrive before 
all of the other committee members are present, since the meeting does not 
start until everyone is present. This situation is characterized by multiple 
Nash equilibria, since no single committee member can unilaterally improve 
on any common appearance time by all the members. Moreover, the equilibria 
are Pareto ranked: Assuming that everyone would like to leave as soon as 
possible, the equilibria that involve starting closer to the announced 3:00 p.m. 
are preferred to those with later starting times. 
Van Huyck et al. (1990) conducted an experiment involving a game with 
this structure. In the experiment 15 subjects independently chose an X value 
numbered 1, 2, 7. In terms of our committee-meeting story, a choice of 7 
corresponds to appearing at the meeting on time, while smaller numbers 
indicated progressively later appearances. Table 5 provides payoffs deter-
mined by an individual's own choice and the choice of the last person to 
arrive. The payoffs are denominated in pennies. Consider a common decision 
1
2 But subjects do appear to use punish/reward strategies in other game contents. 
See, Davis and Holt (1990,1991a). EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 193 
of 7, which yields 130 per person, the Pareto-dominant outcome. By 
reducing your choice from 7 to 6, you also reduce the minimum choice to 
6, so the outcome is moved up along the diagonal to a common payoff of 
120. As is clear from inspection of these payoffs, all of the decisions 
involving a common choice (e.g., on the diagonal) are Nash equilibria, 
since payoffs decrease with a unilateral deviations from any diagonal 
element. Each experiment session consisted of a sequence of ten stages. In 
each stage participants made decisions privately. Then the lowest 
numbered choice was announced, and payoffs were determined, and the 
process repeated, until after the tenth stage, at which time earnings were 
totaled, and participants were paid. 
Table 5 
A Coordination Game with Multiple, Pareto-Ranked Nash Equilibria: 




Smallest value of X chosen 
3 4 5 6 
1  70  - - - - - -
2  60  80  -
_  - - -
3  50  70  90  - - -
4  40  60  80  100  - - -
5  30  50  70  90  110  - -
6  20  40  60  80  100  120  -
7  10  30  50  70  90  110  130 
1  2  7 
The results of a representative session are shown in figure 4. The stage 
number and choices are listed on the two axes defining the horizontal plane, 
while the vertical axis represents the proportion of participants selecting a 
choice. In initial stages of the game, many participants selected the choice 
involving the Pareto-dominant outcome. For example, in the first stage, many 
participants chose 7, and the modal decision was 5. Stage 1 earnings, however, 
were determined by the single participant who chose 4. These low payoffs 
clearly damped incentives to appear "on time", in subsequent stages, and the 
portion of "late arrivals" increased as the periods passed. By stage 10, almost 
all participants chose decision 1. 
Van Huyck et al. did observe more cooperation in games with the same 
structure, but with smaller (2 or 3 person) committees. The primary result of 
the experiment, however is clear from figure 4: Pareto dominance alone does 
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Figure 4 
Results of a Coordination—Game Session 
Percent 
Choice 
123 4 567 89 10 
Stage 
Source: Van Huyck ef al, 1990, Session 4. 
Much of the current interest in game experiments stems from a desire to 
assess the empirical properties of equilibrium selection criterion such as 
Pareto dominance. A critical problem with many noncooperative games is 
that they exhibit an embarrassingly large array of Nash equilibria. The 
subsequent effort among theorists to prune away the less plausible of these 
equilibria has spawned an entire "refinements" literature, characterized by a 
series of highly suggestive adjectives such as "perfect", "intuitive", "strategi-
cally stable", "divine", and "universally divine", which modify the Nash 
equilibrium concept. If game theory is to avoid becoming a branch of mathe-
matics (or theology), it is essential to empirically distinguish among these 
definitions. The laboratory is particularly useful for this purpose, since 
these refinements often differ in very subtle ways, such as differing assump-
tions regarding the nature of beliefs off the equilibrium path, or in portions 
of the game that are never played. 
Laboratory investigation in this area has already provided some very 
concrete lessons. The approach of most refinements is to consider an equilibrium, 
and to think about what would be reasonable beliefs about behavior following a 
deviation. This approach is especially speculative for a deviation that takes 
players to a part of the game that is never reached in the process of equilibrium 
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different partners, and disequilibrium decisions in early matchings may have 
taken subjects to parts of the game tree that are riot encountered in later 
matchings after some equilibrium is reached. What is important here is that 
subjects' beliefs about what would happen off of the equilibrium path are 
influenced by what actually happened during the disequilibrium adjustment 
process in previous matchings. Brandts and Holt (1992) show that the observed 
patterns of naive behavior during early matchings can correspond to belief s that 
are ruled out by all of the standard refinements (equilibrium dominance, divinity, 
and strategic stability). As a consequence, outcomes in some of their sessions 
approximated the outcomes for equilibria that are ruled out by these refinements. 
These data highlight the importance of studying adjustment patterns instead of 
constructing deductive arguments about subjects' beliefs. 
c) A third stream of experiments, called individual decision theory experi-
ments, grew from a skepticism among psychologists and others regarding the 
behavioral relevance of the expected utility theory proposed by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). The resulting experiments were of ob-
vious interest to theorists, as expected utility theory forms the basis of the way 
that economists' model allocations in stochastic environments. 
A typical experimental investigation of this type evaluates one of the 
axioms of expected utility theory by eliciting responses to a question that 
cleanly distinguishes behavior that is inconsistent with the axiom, from 
behavior that is consistent. Such questions typically involve a choice among 
pairs of lotteries. Consider, for example, two lotteries with payoffs 
(denominated in British pounds) determined by a roulette wheel. The wheel 
has 100-stops, which are numbered consecutively 1,2,100. Payoffs for the 
two lotteries are illustrated in figure 5. As is clear from the upper row, the 
"safe" lottery SI yields a payoff of £7 with certainty, while the "risky" lottery 
Rl yields a payoff £10 with a probability of 20%; £7 with a probability of .75; 
and £0 with a probability of .05. 
Figure 5 
Representation of the Choice Between a Lottery Pair Rl and SI 
1 5  80  81 100 
Lottery SI  £7  £7  £7 
Lottery Rl  £0  £7  £10 
The format of figure 5 highlights an important relationship between the 
2 lotteries: they share the common consequence of a £7 payoff for outcomes 
6-80. Under the independence axiom of expected utility theory, the preferen-
ces of an expected utility maximizer are independent of a change in a common 
consequence. The independence axiom could be evaluated by changing the 196 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
payoff for 20 the common consequence from £7 to £0. This alteration generates 
the second lottery pair, S2 and R2 shown in Figure 6. If the independence 
axiom is valid, an expected utility maximizer given a choice of both lotteries 
would choose either SI and S2, or Rl and R2. 
Figure 6 
Lotteries Rl and SI Transformed to Lotteries R2 and S2 by a 
Common Consequence 
1 c  5 go  gl inn 
Lottery SI  £7  £0  £7 
Lottery Rl  £0  £0  £10 
Laboratory investigations of this type of lottery choice reveal rather 
persistent deviations from expected utility theory. Starmer and Sugden (1991), 
for example, report an experiment where participants were presented with 
the (SI, Rl) and (S2, R2) lottery pairs. Results of their experiment are sum-
marized in Table 6. As is clear from the table, participants do not tend to view 
these lottery choices as equivalent. Given a choice between SI and Rl, 68% of 
the participants selected the relatively safe lottery. But preferences for the 
relatively safe lottery were damped when given the choice of S2 and R2. In 
this case, only 42% of the participants selected "safe" lottery S2. 
Violations of this type have been observed in numerous instances. The 
Starmer and Sugden design is remarkable in the care that the authors used in 
controlling for rival behavioral motivations. For example, unlike many studies 
of individual decision theory by psychologists (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979), decisions are financially motivated. Moreover, Starmer and Sugden avoid 
potential complications due to wealth effects by having separate samples in-
dividuals drawn from the same pool make the (SI, Rl) and (S2, R2) lottery choices.
1
3 
Anomalous decisions of this type are-mitigated somewhat by factors 
such as experience and increases in payoffs (Kagel, MacDonald, and 
Battalio, 1990). Such factors, however, do not eliminate the inconsistent 
choice patterns.
1
4 The persistence of such anomalies raises a series of rather 
difficult theoretical questions. For example, exactly which axiom is violated? 
1
3 Wealth effects could become a problem if participants played a sequence of 
lotteries, due to changes in earnings within the session. 
1
4 One experimental design with particularly salient rewards involves the use of 
rats, who make choices over levers that yield random payoffs in food pellets (Battalto, 
Kagel and MacDonald, 1985; Kagel, MacDonald and Battalio, 1990). Although rats 
presumably do not have the same cognitive process as humans, it is interesting to note 
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Is it the independence axiom, as suggested above, or the somewhat less 
problematic reduction of compound lotteries axiom? Should expected utility 
theory be generalized to accommodate the observed behavior, and if so, how? 
Table 6 
Allais Paradox Data 
Percent of Subjects Choosing 
SI over Rl S2 over R2 
40 subjects 
(with single financially 
motivatea choice)  68% — 
40 subjects 
(with single financially 
motivatea choice)  — 42% 
Source: Starmer and Sugden, 1991. 
Rather than moving toward a consensus, researchers in this area 
appear to be sorting themselves into three rather distinct camps. One 
group appears to reject expected utility theory altogether, and proposes 
founding economic theory on an alternative basis (e.g., Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). Another group proposes retaining expected utility theory, 
but generalizing it in a way that accommodates the observed behavior 
(Machina, 1982; Loomes and Sugden, 1982). These generalized theories 
have the disadvantage that they involve assumptions that are more cum-
bersome to incorporate into complex models than the assumptions under-
lying a simple von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Finally, a third 
group suggests that it is possible that the pattern of violations could be 
explained within expected utility theory, but allowing for the possibility 
that humans make mistakes, particularly when the difference in expected 
values are small (Hey, 1991). This "theory of errors" is clearly the least 
radical of the alternatives, but it is not clear at this time which alternative 
will ultimately be more useful. 
Finally, it is worth observing thai not all individual-decision experiments 
are designed to assess the axioms of expected utility theory. A variety of other 
issues involving individual decisions have been investigated in the laboratory 
including eliciting values for nonmarketed goods such as clean air or a scenic 
view (Coursey, Hovis and Schultze, 1987; Knetsch and Sinden, 1987), the 
predictions of sequential search theory (Schotter and Braunstein, 1981; Cox 
and Oaxaca, 1989), and forecasting (Williams, 1987; Smith, Suchanek and 
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4. Some Common Objections to Experimentation 
Experimentation, of course, is no panacea, and there are a variety of legitimate 
reasons for avoiding experimental methods in some contexts. Experimenta-
tion, for example, could render little useful information about the values of 
specific parameters outside of the laboratory, parameters such as the average 
costs of a firm or individual bequest motives. But carefully designed and 
administered experiments can generate valuable insights in a very wide 
variety situations. Although experimental methods have in fact been broadly 
applied in economics, there are a number of reservations regarding the use 
of experiments that we feel are not legitimate, which have inhibited ex-
perimentation. In this section we identify.and respond to four of the most 
common such reservations. These objections fall into two basic classes. The 
first class, summarized in (a) and (b) below, stems from the perception that 
logical status of theory makes experimentation unnecessary. The second class 
of reservations, articulated below in (c) and (d), regards misgivings about the 
way experiments are conducted. 
a) Theory is logically true. A first reservation is that experimentation is 
unnecessary, because a theory is "correct" as long as it is internally consistent. 
But more is, or at least should be, required of a theory than that there are no 
errors in the underlying mathematics. Internal consistency is only a first step. 
Economic theories should have some explanatory power as well. 
Economic theories are based on two kinds of assumptions, behavioral and 
structural. The primary purpose of experimentation is to evaluate behavioral 
assumptions. In the laboratory, we match a theory's incentive and structural 
conditions, and then observe the validity of the behavioral assumptions. If 
humans don't match our theoretical behavioral presumptions, then the theory 
is incorrect, and it must be altered, despite its internal consistency. 
Critically, humans are not necessarily stupid or foolish if they fail to make 
the decisions predicted by our theories, and it is generally not useful to tell the 
participants how to behave in such instances. If behavioral suggestions of this 
type are enforced, they convert an experimental investigation into a simula-
tion. This is not to denigrate the importance of simulations as an analytic tool. 
Rather our purpose is to distinguish experimental investigation, an empirical 
technique, trom simulation, which is a theoretical device for extending the 
range of application for theories that do not have analytic solutions. 
Simulations impose both behavioral and structural assumptions on 
parameterized versions of a model, and then rely on a computer algorithm to 
generate outcomes. Experiments are a means of evaluating behavioral as-
sumptiops. 
b) Theory is normative. A second objection to experimentation is that it is 
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predicting how they do behave. This attitude is not at all unusual for a 
decision theorist. Operations research theorists, for example, have tradition-
ally considered their job as prescriptive. The mindset, however, is consider-
ably more problematic for economists, who have traditionally viewed their 
science as a descriptive inquiry. For example, we find the recently espoused 
view that game-theory is normative (Rubinstein, 1991), rather bizarre. The 
application of game theory to industrial organization issues, for example, is 
presumably not done primarily as a corrective service for imperfectly operat-
ing cartels. Rather we are interested in predicting when stable, supra-com-
petitive prices will or will not be observed. 
c) The laboratory is too simple. This third reservation regards the way 
experiments are conducted. The world is a complicated place, filled with 
complex, multi-dimensional interactions. Laboratory environments, in stark 
contrast, examine human decisions in extremely simple environments. How 
can decisions made under such simple, streamlined conditions hope to tell us 
anything useful? 
Upon reflection, it should be clear that this reservation is a criticism of 
economic theory as much as it is a criticism of experimentation. Theories are 
necessarily extremely simplified characterizations of the complicated natural 
world. If the complications of the natural world are expected to systemati-
cally affect outcomes, then a more complex theory should be constructed. 
If not, then the theory should be evaluated. Moreover, this evaluation 
process should ideally begin, not in the domain of the complex natural 
world, where numerous confounding events may impinge on variables of 
interest, but strictly on the domain of the theory, where all structural 
assumptions can be implemented. The laboratory is an ideal and unique 
environment for evaluating a theory on its own domain. Of course, obser-
vation of the theory "working" in the laboratory does not imply that it 
explains behavior in the natural world. But the failure ot a theory under the 
"best shot" circumstances of the laboratory suggest that the theory is not a 
good explainer of behavior. It is perhaps in this role of theory rejection that 
experimentation is most useful. 
Importantly, it is not the view of experimentalists that other empirical 
methods, particularly econometrics, are without merit. Econometrics very 
usefully allows theory to be evaluated in light of data from the natural world, 
via the use of a series of auxiliary assumptions. Experimentation allows more 
direct evaluation of theory in a simplified environment, but without the need 
of auxiliary assumptions. 
d) Subjects are too naive. A final reservation regards the subjects typically 
used in laboratory research. Even if it is desirable to evaluate a theoretical 
prediction in a very simple environment, the critic may contend that the 
environment is inappropriate because the laboratory decision makers (typi-200 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
cally college students) are less sophisticated that the decision makers in the 
relevant natural environment. 
This final reservation is not an objection to experimentation per se, but 
rather, an objection to the way economists have come to conduct experiments. 
Certainly, if "relevant" professionals do not behave like student subjects, then 
the appropriate subject pool should be composed of relevant professionals. 
Of course, providing salient rewards to relevant professionals would increase 
the costs of experimental investigations, often by a dramatic amount. But this 
would just mean that experimentation is more expensive than previously 
thought. 
For obvious reasons, experimentalists have been interested in the 
relationship between decisions made by participants in "standard" subject 
pools, and the decisions of relevant professionals (e.g., Ball and Cech, 1991). 
While the subject pool issue is a matter that must be addressed on an 
experiment-by-experiment basis, it is interesting to note that in a variety of 
instances where the laboratory behavior of both students and relevant profes-
sionals has been examined, performance has generally not varied substantial-
ly across subject pools. Businessmen traders, for example, tend to generate 
speculative price bubbles, as do college sophomores. (Smith, Suchanek and 
Williams, 1988). Similarly, building.contractors are as susceptible to a 
"winner's curse" as college students (Dyer, Kagel and Levine, 1989),
1
5 and 
one group of ecologically conscious environmentalists were observed to free 
ride in a manner Very similar to college sophomores (Mestelman and Feeny, 
1988). 
In summary, there a number of reasons for not doing experiments. 
Although some of these claims are not meritless, they do not outweigh the 
critical advantages of replicability and control allowed by careful experimen-
tal investigation. For these reasons, the use of experimentation as a means of 
evaluating economic theory propositions both has grown and should con-
tinue to grow. 
5. What We've Learned: How to Ask a Question 
If experimentation is valuable, and economists have been doing it for several 
decades, what have we learned? Certainly, we've learned something about 
1
5 The winner's curse arises in common value auctions, where an item has the same 
value to all bidders, but where that value is unknown until after the purchase. Under 
such conditions, the agent that submits the highest bid is likely to be the one who makes 
the largest mistake. Unless the bidders make an appropriate downward adjustment in 
their bids, the winner of such an auction may be cursed with a loss. EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 201 
economic theory. These are the most expected lessons of experimentation, 
and we will consider them in the next section. But we have also learned a 
great deal about how to conduct experiments. It is these lessons we which to 
consider first. Importantly, although some of these lessons may appear a bit 
specific to a general reader, as a group they constitute far more than just a 
series of narrow procedural issues. To the contrary, successful experimenta-
tion is a process of learning how to pose questions, get answers, and then 
develop further questions. This process is critical to the development of any 
empirical science. 
a) The Details Matter. First, we've learned that physical procedures are 
important, and that close attention must be given to 3 number of issues. At 
the heart of experimentation is the capacity for independent verification. 
Independent verification not insures the honesty of results, but allows ex-
amination of the extent to which outcomes are the result of particular 
parameters or procedures. Without careful attention to detail, verification is 
impossible. 
Thus, an experiment must be administered meticulously. Subjects must 
be called, instructed, monitored, and paid in a manner that is both,uniform 
and standard. Similarly, experiment instructions and administrative details 
must be spelled out, followed, and reported in detail. The test that any 
experimenter should use as a guide in administering and reporting results of 
an experiment is an affirmative answer to the following question: Can an 
outside observer replicate the experiment in a manner that the original 
researcher and other observers would accept as being valid? 
It is easy to find examples of published and unpublished papers with 
"fatal" procedural errors, such as carelessness with instructions or proce-
dures, and low or nonsalient financial incentives. Those familiar with ex-
perimental methods simply will not take the results of an experiment 
seriously unless it satisfies some basic standards ot replicability. 
b) The Importance of Design. Second, we've learned that attention to the 
design of treatments is essential to drawing unambiguous conclusions from 
laboratory evidence. Parameters must be selected carefully, to avoid extra, 
unwanted equilibria, or to avoid having someone explain away the results as 
due to some overlooked, extraneous factors (such as focalness or symmetry). 
Experimentation is a little like computer programming; a seemingly small 
design error can render the outputdifficult to interpret, or even useless. 
As with procedural matters, there are a number of common "fatal-
design errors typically made by a new researcher in designing ari experiment, 
The most common of these errors are: (1) failure to calibrate results with a 
baseline treatment; (2) failure to restrict focus to a few treatments of interest; 
and (3) failure to choose the degree of institutional complexity appropriate to 
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procedural issues just discussed, and for this reason we consider them 
separately, below. 
1) Calibration. In order to draw a conclusion that a given variable (or 
combination of variables) elicits a particular kind of behavior, it is necessary 
to conduct baseline sessions that parallel the treatment sessions in every 
relevant respect except for hypothesized variable(s) of interest. This is made 
clear with an example. Suppose we are interested in the effects of market 
power on prices in posted-offer markets. (By market power, we mean designs 
where the competitive equilibrium is not a Nash equilibrium, because one or 
more sellers can profit by unilaterally increasing prices above the competitive 
level.) To'evaluate this question, suppose we conduct a series laboratory 
sessions in markets where some sellers have market power, and find that 
prices hang high above competitive levels. Regardless of the number of 
sessions we conduct, we cannot conclude from this treatment alone that 
market power increases prices. Although the observed high prices could be 
due to market power, they could also be a consequence of a variety of other 
design features, such as the number of sellers or the low excess supply at 
supracompetitive prices. Rather, to determine the effects of market power, 
two treatments must be conducted: one with power and one without, holding 
all other things (such as the number of sellers, and aggregate supply and 
demand) constant. Price increases can be attributed to market power only it 
price increases were observed in the power sessions, but not in the no-power 
sessions. 
2) Focus. When designing an experiment, it also important to confine 
attention to only a few control variables. Altering a variable to explore an 
additional effect is seductively easy. This temptation, however must be 
avoided, since the number of necessary treatment cells increases exponential-
ly with increases in the number of treatment variables. Suppose, for example, 
that we were interested in examining the effects of a change in the number of 
sellers in the market power experiment discussed above. This issue increases 
the number of treatment combinations from 2, to (2
2 =) 4. A third control 
variable, say the effects of live rather than simulated buyers, would again 
double the number of possible treatment combinations, to (2
3 =) 8 cells. 
Granted, not all treatment combinations are always of equal interest, and 
under certain conditions it is possible to reduce the number of treatment 
combinations for a given number of variables. But the lesson remains: Trying 
to look at too much in a single investigation can easily make it impossible to 
learn anything. 
A related issue pertains to parameters that are in fact altered across 
treatments. It is surprisingly common for researchers to make inadvertent 
alterations along with intentional variable changes. In a lottery-choice experi-
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balance when the choice involves an expected loss, but to consider such a 
payment unnecessary when the decision involves an expected gain. Com-
parison across decisions is muddied in this case by the difference in wealth. 
This does not necessarily mean that only a single parameter can be 
altered in a session. To the contrary, in order to hold the predictions of a theory 
constant, it is sometimes necessary to change more than one economic 
parameter. For example, to evaluate the effects of changing the number of 
sellers on market power, concentration must simultaneously be increased if 
market power (the underlying Nash equilibrium) is held constant.
1
6 
A more general representation of the relationship between theories, 
treatments and possible outcomes is presented in figure 7. In the figure, two 
variables under the experimenter's control (denoted x and y), are represented 
in the horizontal plane, where each point corresponds to a treatment. Obse-
Ned outcomes are measured along the vertical axis. If the experimenter 
wishes to evaluate two alternative theories, treatments must be altered so that 
predictions, denominated in terms of the observable outcomes, allow a dis-
tinction between the two theories. In the figure, for example, one of the 
theories predicts no change in outcomes (denoted by the solid horizontal line) 
while the other (denoted by the dotted line) predicts a change. The critical 
element is to manipulate the control variables, either singly or in combination, 
in such a way that in one (baseline) treatment the predictions of two theories 
overlap and in another treatment, the predictions diverge. The former treat-
ment allows assessment of presumably spurious alterations in sessions (such 
as group effects, and the inherent variability of outcomes), while the latter, 
allows evaluation of the relative performance of theories in light of the 
variability observed in the baseline. 
3) Appropriate Complexity. Experimentation is a process of hypothesizing, 
designing an environment that allows evaluation of the hypothesis, collecting 
relevant data, and then starting the cycle again, using what was learned as a 
basis for further hypothesizing. Rarely is it the case that the "crucial experi-
ment" is conducted in a first iteration of this process. (For that matter, such 
an experiment is rarely conducted in any iteration!) An important element in 
this repeated cycle of hypothesis, design and evaluation, is selecting the 
appropriate complexity. The natural economy is overwhelmingly complex. 
The process of theorizing is one of disregarding supposedly inessential 
details. Yet further simplification is possible if the researcher intends to 
evaluate only certain elements of a theory. Where in this array of possibilities 
should testing begin? Given a starting point, in what direction should future 
1(> See, for example. Davis and Holt (1991b). 204 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
investigation proceed? Finally, how are tests of differing underlying com-
plexity related? 
Figure 7 
Evaluating a Theory: The Relationship between 
Control Variables and Outcomes 
Although there is no necessary starting point for experimental investiga-
tion, we can say something about the directions research can take. To keep 
this discussion concrete, suppose we focus on just two dimensions: the 
environment, which includes the structure of preferences, technology, etc., and 
the institution, which defines the rules of exchange. A simple market theory 
would involve a particular environment (e.g., some number of buyers and 
sellers, with given value and cost incentives) and a given institution, such as 
the posted offer. These two dimensions are illustrated in Figure 8. 
Each point in the two-dimensional domain is a treatment. The domain 
of the theory is the set of points for which the assumptions of the theory are 
satisfied exactly (remember that this can be restrictive, even for general 
theories, if we need to make assumptions about functional forms to get 
comparative statics predictions that can be tested.) Often, a natural place to 
begin evaluation is at a point that is strictly on the domain of a theory. A 
"theory test" (TT) would involve a pair of points in this domain. For example, 
a theory test might be the resilience of competitive price predictions to 
institutional alterations 11 and 12 (e.g., from posted offer to double auction), 
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Figure 8 
Types of Experiments 
E1 E2 Environmental 
complexity 
Key: CT: component test, TT: theory test, ST: stress test, SR: search for empirical regularities, 
FT: field test. 
Regardless of the results of the experiment, further testing is usually 
called for if the theory fails on its domain, the issue becomes a question of 
determining Which component of the theory fails This leads to component 
tests in simpler environments (points CT) Recent research involving ul-
timatum games illustrates the notion of a component test Consider the 
following problem. Suppose two laboratory participants are presented a 
$10 pie, which they are to divide between themselves. The division is 
determined by a very simple process: One player proposes (as an "ul-
timatum") the terms of the division. The other player either accepts the 
proposed division, in which case the terms are as proposed, or rejects, in 
which case both players earn nothing. The unique Nash equilibrium for 
this game, involves an extremely inequitable division of the pie: The first 
player should ask for the whole pie, minus epsilon. This division should 
be accepted, since the epsilon offered to the other is greater than the zero 
that results from rejection. Behaviorally, however, quite different out-
comes tend to be generated in laboratory ultimatum games. Results of a 
representative ultimatum game experiment reported by Forstyhe et al, 206 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
1988 are illustrated by the dark spike in the back of Figure 9. As is evident 
from the spike, the median offer is half of the pie. 
Figure 9 
Frequency of Offers in Ultimatum and Dictator Games 
anonymous) 
Sources: Forsythe et ai, 1988, for ultimatum and dictator game data; Hoffman et ai., 1991, for 
doubleblind, dictator-game data). 
Given the failure of the Nash equilibrium prediction, the next step was 
a component test, to determine the questionable assumption of the theory. For 
example, are equal divisions observed because proposers are concerned about 
fairness, or because they are concerned about the rejection of an "equilibrium" 
proposal. These possibilities may be distinguished via still simpler com-
ponent tests. For example, fairness concerns can be distinguished from con-
cerns about "irrational" buyer rejections in a "dictator" game, where one 
player proposes a split of the $10 pie. Unlike the ultimatum game, however, 
the proposal determines the outcome; the other player has no opportunity to 
accept or reject the proposed split. 
As in the ultimatum game, the proposer takes essentially the whole pie 
in a Nash equilibrium for the dictator game, and leaves nothing to the other 
player. This test is a component of the ultimatum game, however, in that 
"irrational" rejection opportunities, (along with the consequences of an-
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Data for a dictator game experiment reported by Forsythe et al. (1988) is 
illustrated by the middle ribbon in Figure 9. As suggested by inspection of 
the data, the possibility of rejection does not alone determine the tendency for 
sellers to lower prices. In the dictator game experiments, the median offer is 
$3.00, below the $5.00 equal-rent division, but well above the $0.00 division 
consistent with a Nash equilibrium. 
The results of this test allow us to rule out "irrational" rejections 
as the primary cause of equitable divisions. Yet other procedures must be 
used, to determine whether fairness concerns, or some other procedural 
issue determines the divisions. A recent paper by Hoffman et al. (1991) 
proposes an alternative procedural motivation for the division: the embar-
rassment of facing an experimenter who knows you have taken everything 
from the participant with whom you are paired. Hoffman et al. evaluate 
this hypothesis with a "double anonymous" treatment, in which great care 
is taken to keep the experimenter from knowing who proposes what split, 
and in which the participants know that the experimenter is unaware of 
the splits. Results of an experiment conducted under this double-
anonymous condition are illustrated by the band in the front of Figure 9. 
Results clearly suggest that anonymity, rather than fairness may explain 
outcomes: under the double-anonymous condition, most dictators offer 
nothing. 
Now consider a second direction for in an experimental research pro-
gram. If the theory works on its domain in an initial investigation, then we 
would want to look at stress tests, or treatment points off of the domain of the 
theory, which stress the theory, points like ST. These points fall in the shadow 
of the theory. Even if a theory performs well on its domain, failure of the 
theory in such stress tests can cast serious doubts on a theory's usefulness. 
Theories of perfect competition are not very useful, for example, if an infinity 
of traders is needed. Similarly, the proposition that potential entrants or 
"contestants" can regulate natural monopolies if entry and exit is costless, is 
not particularly interesting if it fails under conditions of small entry or exit 
costs. In short, stress tests allow evaluation of the appropriateness of the 
abstractions made by the theory. 
Successful stress tests may lead to tests that deviate even more substan-
tially from the assumptions of the theory. In the extreme case, field tests (points 
FT) are conducted in natural markets. Finally, not all laboratory tests are 
conducted with exact reference to the domain of any theory. Experimen-
talists can look for interesting patterns of behavior, guided only by intui-
tion or informal arguments. This process of searching for empirical regularities 
is illustrated by the points labelled SR in the upper right portion of the 
figure. Examinations of this type can provide useful information for 
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6. What We've Learned: The State of Theory 
Finally, we turn to the question of what experimentation has taught us about 
economic theory. We are able to make discussion rather terse, because the 
examples used above were not selected randomly, but were chosen to il-
lustrate some of the primary lessons of experimentation. In this section we 
summarize five general results of experimental investigation, and illustrate 
them in terms of the examples mentioned above. 
a) In at least some markets, competitive predictions are remarkably robust. 
Markets organized under double-auction rules generate competitive predic-
tions so pervasively, that any design that generates deviation is publishable. 
This result was illustrated by the double auction market session (Figure 2). 
b) Institutions matter. Performance in markets organized under posted-
offer trading rules, for example, can be markedly different from performance 
in double-auction markets that are similar in all respects except for the 
institution (as seen in Figures 2 and 3 above). The specification of the institu-
tional rules parallels work in the "new" game-theoretic industrial organization. 
For this reason, there has been a lot of interest in experimental work among 
both game and industrial organization theorists. 
c) Some of the predictions of game theory work In general, participants appear 
drawn to Nash equilibria when they exist, particularly in static games. This 
was illustrated in the one-shot prisoner's dilemma experiment, summarized 
in Tables 3 and 4. 
d) Our game theories are sometimes incomplete. The refinement of Pareto 
dominance, for example, appears to organize equilibrium selection in a 
two-person coordination game, but Pareto dominance fails when the number 
of participants is increased to fifteen (as shown in Figure 5). This conclusion 
is seen in a number of other important applications. In public goods experi-
ments, for example, a whole host of theoretically irrelevant variables appear 
to affect participant's tendencies to "free ride". 
e) In yet other instances we observe anomalies: The assumptions of our theories 
just seem to fail to work. This problem is particularly noticeable in individual 
decision experiments, as illustrated by results of the Allais paradox experi-
ment shown in Figures 5 and 6, and in Table 6. Such "anomalies" call for 
further investigation to determine their pervasiveness, as well as for a 
consideration of alternative theories. 
What you might conclude about what we have learned depends on your 
perspective, and on where you start on the list. Some overview presentations 
of experimental work focus on the elements at the top of the list. These studies 
are of great comfort to theorist, as they make experimentation look like a 
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two centuries. Others prefer to focus on the lessons mentioned at the bottom 
of the above list. From these, one gets the distinct impression that we should 
quit economics, or at least start over and study psychology. 
Our conclusion is intermediate. Sometimes theory explains behavior well, 
sometimes it isn't rich enough, and sometimes it is simply wrong. Of course, the 
case where a theory is completely general, is palatable to the theorist. But we wish 
to emphasize the converse point. The possibility that theory can be wrong, or 
limited in application, does not imply that theory must be rejected, or that the 
clay feet upon which our science is founded will or even should lead to a 
toppling of the entire edifice. Anomalies simply are not devastating. Rather, 
they are a normal part of an empirical science, and are one of the signs that a 
paradigm should be modified. Things that work are an indication that we 
should continue with the same paradigm. The places where theory is insufi-
ciently rich suggest an interchange between the theorist and the experimenter. 
7. Conclusions 
As mentioned above, experimentation is no panacea. Many important issues 
in economics simply cannot be addressed the lab. An antitrust case, for 
example, may hinge on the measurement of an average cost (to determine 
whether a seller was pricing in a predatory manner), and this is an issue that 
must be resolved by measurement outside of the laboratory. For similar 
reasons, experimentation cannot be expected to tell us much interesting about 
bequest motives or Ricardian equivalence. These are issues about parameters 
and preferences in nature. 
But from the laboratory, we both have learned and can learn much about 
economic theory. Through trial and error, experimentalists over the last 40 
years have cultivated the capacity to exploit the control allowed by the laboratory 
to evaluate economic theory precisely on its own domain. Similar data simply 
are not available in the natural world, and the importance such data will 
undoubtedly appreciate in value as the new, institution-specific theories become 
more refined. Careful laboratory testing may provide the discipline that prevents 
this new theory from collapsing under its own complexity. 
There are anomalies, inconsistencies, and surprises in the lab. But this is 
troublesome only to the extent that we expect actual behavior to conform with 
all of the elegance and precision of the theoretical models that pervade the 
text books and journals. Indeed, a willingness to seek inconsistencies is useful. 
As Vernon Smith (1989) argues, the most productive attitude is to be skeptical 
of both the theory and the data. And we believe that both our understanding, 
and this healthy skepticism will increase as economics becomes more of an 
experimental science. 210 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
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